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DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 1983 FOR
ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
RECONSIDERING THE
APPLICABILITY OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
An individual who alleges that police officers violated his fourth
amendment rights by an illegal search and seizure has a cause of action
for damages against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' The doctrine
of collateral estoppel, however, will often deny a defendant in a state
criminal prosecution the opportunity to litigate his section 1983 claim
in a federal forum.2 Most federal courts have held that a state criminal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statute, originally enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the other party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In the case of an illegal search and seizure, the plaintiff is, of course, alleging a violation of his
fourth amendment rights as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The defen-
dant police officer in a section 1983 case is not strictly or absolutely liable for the violation. He
enjoys a qualified immunity. To succeed, the plaintiff must show that the officer acted without
good faith and without reasonable belief that probable cause existed for the search or for the
arrest. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
A section 1983 plaintiff is apparently entitled to recover only nominal damages absent proof
of actual injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). In Carey the Court indicated that the
common law of tort will govern the damages recoverable in section 1983 actions. Carey, however,
involved a denial of procedural due process rather than a denial of fourth amendment rights. It is
not certain, therefore, whether the requirement of proof of actual injury will be extended to an
action involving a violation of fourth amendment rights.
2. The following sequence of hypothetical events illustrates a situation in which collateral
estoppel frequently would be applied: the local police enter a suspect's home in violation of the
fourth amendment, make a thorough search, and seize certain items to be used as evidence against
the suspect in a state criminal proceeding. At trial, the defendant moves to suppress the evidence,
alleging that the search and seizure violated rights secured to him by the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. The defendant bases his motion to suppress on the exclusionary rule,
extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio
at Large in the Ffty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319. The issue is litigated in a suppression hearing
and the court denies the motion to suppress. The evidence, admitted at trial, is instrumental in
gaining a conviction for the state. Subsequently, the defendant files a civil action for damages in
federal district court pursuant to section 1983, alleging that the police violated his constitutional
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conviction estops the plaintiff in a subsequent civil rights action from
litigating issues that were actually litigated and necessarily resolved
against him in the prior criminal proceeding.3 Thus, when a defendant
has unsuccessfully litigated fourth amendment issues in a state court
suppression hearing, most federal courts will effectively preclude him
from bringing a subsequent section 1983 civil damages action.
Many of the cases applying collateral estoppel to the section 1983
complaint of a convicted offender were decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Stone v. Powell4 The courts assumed or expressly
stated that an alternate route to federal court was available to the liti-
gant through federal habeas corpus.5 In Stone, however, the Court
held that federal habeas corpus relief need not be available when
fourth amendment issues have been previously litigated in a state tribu-
nal.6 If a prior state adjudication of federal constitutional issues were
to preclude a subsequent section 1983 action in federal district court,
many plaintiffs would therefore be denied access to any federal forum.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in McCurry v. Allen,7
recently ruled that the interest in providing a federal forum for the liti-
gation of fourth amendment claims under section 1983 overrides the
interests and policies which would otherwise warrant the application of
collateral estoppel. Under McCurry, therefore, an individual who has
had an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of a search and
seizure in a state suppression hearing can still bring a section 1983 ac-
tion in federal court.
This Note will examine the doctrine of collateral estoppel as ap-
plied by the federal courts to section 1983 actions. The Note will then
rights by conducting an illegal search and seizure. The section 1983 defendants thereupon inter-
pose collateral estoppel as a defense to the plaintiffs action by moving for summary judgment.
The court grants the motion upon a showing that the issue of the constitutionality of the search
and seizure was fully litigated in the state suppression hearing and was there determined adversely
to the section 1983 plaintiff.
3. See, e.g., Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1978) (a plaintiff is collaterally
estopped as long as his state conviction was valid); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (ist Cir.
1974) (application of collateral estoppel to section 1983 actions is supported by the overwhelming
weight of authority), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Zurek v. Woodbury, 446 F. Supp. 1149
(N.D. Il. 1978) (a state criminal conviction will estop the plaintiff in a civil rights action from
litigating issues necessarily resolved against him in the prior criminal proceeding); Smith v. Sin-
clair, 424 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (the Civil Rights Act was not designed to sponsor
career litigants); Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Il1. 1969) (collateral estoppel applied).
4. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
5. See note 124 infra and cases cited therein.
6. See text accompanying notes 118-22 infra.
7. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-935). McCurry
has been followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d
240 (9th Cir. 1980).
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analyze the Eighth Circuit's decision in McCurry," which rejects the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in this context. Finally, the Note will
discuss four reasons for permitting plaintiffs to bring section 1983 ac-
tions free from the bar of collateral estoppel. First, the Congress that
enacted section 1983 clearly contemplated that the federal courts would
be the primary guardians of rights protected by that legislation.9 In
refusing to apply collateral estoppel, the McCurry court acknowledged
the special role that the federal courts play in protecting civil rights.' 0
While the need to interpose federal judicial power between the citizens
and the state governments is not as compelling today as when the
Forty-second Congress enacted section 1983,11 institutional differences
between the federal and state judicial systems still necessitate the pres-
ervation of a federal forum. Second, permitting a section 1983 action
for damages is consistent with the policy of comity. t2 A subsequent
section 1983 action brought in federal court does not imply disrespect
for the prior conviction in a state court. Third, the removal in Stone v.
Powell'3 of the federal habeas corpus remedy for fourth amendment
violations compels the conclusion that access to the federal courts
under section 1983 must not be restricted by the rules of collateral es-
toppel. The McCurry court refused to apply collateral estoppel be-
cause, inter alia, federal habeas corpus was unavailable to the criminal
defendant.' 4 Finally, the necessity for an effective remedy for fourth
amendment violations requires that section 1983 actions be un-
hampered by the pitfalls of collateral estoppel.' 5 The application of
collateral estoppel to section 1983 actions that follow state court pro-
ceedings negates the purpose of section 1983: to provide an effective
federal remedy for the violation of federal constitutional rights.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN THE SECTION 1983 CONTEXT
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 16 comprises a subset of the
principles more generally denominated "res judicata."' 7 Three ele-
8. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-935).
9. See text accompanying notes 51-68 infra.
10. 606 F.2d at 799.
11. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
12. Considerations of comity have often been used to justify the application of collateral
estoppel to section 1983 actions that follow state proceedings. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Trias
Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 856 (1st Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 87-111 infra.
13. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See text accompanying notes 112-43 infra.
14. 606 F.2d at 799.
15. See text accompanying notes 144-68 infra.
16. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) refers to res
judicata as "claim preclusion" and collateral estoppel as "issue preclusion."
17. The principle of res judicata means that a judgment in an action,
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ments are necessary to support a defense of collateral estoppel. First,
the fact or question in issue must have been directly adjudicated or
necessarily determined in a proceeding in which a final judgment on
the merits was rendered. Second, those issues a party seeks to relitigate
must be identical to those adjudicated in the prior action. Third, the
party against whom the defense is asserted must have been a party, or
in privity with a party, to the prior action.' 8
The basic premise supporting the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
that litigation must eventually end. Both society and litigants demand
that the judicial system operate efficiently, that the integrity of judg-
ments not be undermined, that principles of comity be respected, and
that litigants not be harrassed by repetitive and vexatious lawsuits.'9
Collateral estoppel is, however, a matter of policy; courts make excep-
tions when there are superior countervailing policy considerations. 20
A. Collateral Estoppel in Section 1983 Actions
Although the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel are es-
sentially judge-made, the concept itself is codified in section 1738 of the
Judicial Code:2' "The. . .judicial proceedings of any. . .State...
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States. . .as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State. . .from which they are taken. ' 22 The statute requires the fed-
eral courts to apply the res judicata rules of the state in which the prior
judgment was rendered, rather than a federal common law of res judi-
cata. Thus, the preclusion of many claims under section 1983 for viola-
tions of constitutional rights may be supported not only by the weight
of judicial authority,2 3 but also by the mandate of section 1738 of the
if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a
finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity
with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877). Collateral estoppel, however, operates so that
in a second action between the same parties, but on a different cause of action, "the judgment in
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered." Id. at 353.
18. E.g., Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924, 933-34 (N.D. II1. 1969).
19. See Vestal, Rationale ofPreclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31 (1964); Note, Developments
in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. RE. 818, 820 (1952); Comment, The Collateral Estoppel
Effect ofState Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 96.
20. See Vestal, supra note 19, at 54-55.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
22. Id. The statute's requirement extends to the federal courts. See Huron Holding Corp. v.
Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941).
23. See, e.g., Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1978) (a plaintiff is collaterally
estopped as long as his state conviction is valid); Wiggins v. Murphy, 576 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1978)
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Judicial Code.24
In the context of fourth amendment claims, a ruling by the court
on a suppression motion, followed by a conviction, is a final judgment
for the purposes of collateral estoppel.25 Hence, many federal courts
have applied collateral estoppel to section 1983 actions that followed
state criminal proceedings. 26 These courts have accepted the proposi-
tion that full litigation of an issue in a state criminal proceeding fore-
closes subsequent relitigation of the issue in a civil proceeding when
resolution of the issue was essential to the conviction.27
Section 1738 collateral estoppel rules, however, have not always
been so rigidly applied. Some federal courts have recognized that dif-
ferent well-defined federal policies may compete with and prevail over
the principles underlying section 1738.28 The policy of adjudicating a
section 1983 cause of action in a federal forum is one such policy. Var-
ious federal courts have therefore narrowly construed the requirements
of collateral estoppel in order to provide a federal forum to the section
1983 litigant when possible.29
Courts limiting the application of section 1738 have generally con-
strued literally the requirement that issues be actually litigated and nec-
essarily determined. These courts hold that an unreversed state
(res judicata precludes a subsequent federal civil rights action), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979);
Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1977) (section 1983 warrants no depar-
ture from collateral estoppel); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974) (application of
collateral estoppel is supported by the weight of authority), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975);
Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.) (collateral estoppel applied against
criminal defendant), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
24. At least one commentator has reached this conclusion. See Currie, Res Judicata: The
Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 317, 327-33 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Beame, 423 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
26. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
27. See, e.g., Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977);
Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
In Thistlethwaite, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when a first amendment
issue had been determined against the section 1983 plaintiffs in a state criminal trial, res judicata
barred the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue in a civil rights suit in federal court. See also Smith
v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Thistlethwaite).
28. See Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs
section 1981 claim barred by res judicata); American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690
& n.1 (5th Cir. 1971) (res judicata applied), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (res judicata not applied to title VII action).
See also Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.) (section 1738 will not be
applied if the question involves a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect
ofPrior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Ornstein v. Regan, 574 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1978) (refusing to apply resjudi-
cata to a section 1983 action). See text accompanying notes 30-35 infra.
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conviction does not by itself require dismissal of a section 1983 claim.30
The federal court must be able to determine clearly from the record
that the same questions were addressed directly and were resolved in
the prior action.3! At least one district court has held that if reasonable
doubt exists as to what issues were decided in the prior action, such
doubt should be resolved by not precluding the plaintiff from litigating
them in the section 1983 action.32 For example, a conviction for re-
sisting arrest does not establish that the police officers had probable
cause to make the arrest. It has thus been held that collateral estoppel
does not preclude a section 1983 action based upon fourth amendment
claims and allegations that the police used excessive force in making
the arrest.33
In Brubaker v. King34 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
construed very narrowly the "actually litigated" requirement of collat-
eral estoppel. The court concluded that the issue to be determined at a
suppression hearing in a state criminal trial (ie., whether the search
violated the fourth amendment) was not the same issue that a section
1983 action presents (ie., whether there was a good faith, reasonable
belief that the search was conducted with probable cause). By defini-
tion, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply because the underlying
issue in the section 1983 action had not been previously litigated in the
state court.35 This approach does not, however, prevent collateral es-
toppel from barring a subsequent section 1983 action founded on a
fourth amendment claim. The problem with this approach is that a
finding by a state tribunal that a police officer made a search and
seizure with probable cause-an objective determination-usually in-
cludes an implicit finding that the officer subjectively acted in good
faith and with the reasonable belief that probable cause existed at the
time of the search and seizure.36 Consequently, when a search and
seizure is challenged in a section 1983 action in federal district court,
the issue of good faith and reasonable belief will have been "actually
30. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1968). See also cases
cited in note 33 infra.
31. See Ornstein v. Regan, 574 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1978) (limits on disability retirement
benefits); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1978) (denial of Medicaid benefits); Ames v.
Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931, 941 (D. Minn. 1973) (fourth amendment violation).
32. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
33. See Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1972); Spencer v. Town of Westerly, R.I.,
430 F. Supp. 636 (D.R.I. 1977); Clark v. Illinois, 415 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. II1. 1976); Wecht v.
Marsteller, 363 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
34. 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 536-38.
36. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 798 n.10 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012
(1980) (No. 79-935).
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litigated" and "necessarily determined" in the state suppression hear-
ing. A court applying normal collateral estoppel principles will be
compelled to dismiss the section 1983 action because all pertinent is-
sues will have been litigated and determined in the prior action.
B. Collateral Estoppel Rejected in McCurry v. Allen.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in McCurry v. Al-
len,37 avoided a disingenuously narrow construction of collateral estop-
pel principles. Instead, the court simply held that collateral estoppel
did not bar a defendant who had been convicted in a state criminal
prosecution from subsequently bringing a section 1983 action, even
though he had already litigated his fourth amendment claim in a sup-
pression hearing.38
In McCurry, six undercover police officers went to McCurry's
house to purchase heroin. The police officers designated to make the
buy asked McCurry if he was willing to sell them heroin. McCurry
went back into his home; when he returned to the door he began shoot-
ing at the police officers. After McCurry surrendered, the police rushed
into the house to check for additional persons. Sometime later, an of-
ficer searched McCurry's home and found heroin inside several draw-
ers, among some tires, and also in plain view in several locations. Prior
to trial, McCurry moved to suppress all this evidence. The trial court,
after a suppression hearing, granted the motion to suppress the evi-
dence discovered in drawers and among the tires, but denied the mo-
tion as to the evidence found in plain view. McCurry was convicted at
trial on one count of illegal possession of heroin and on two counts of
assault with intent to kill.3 9
After his conviction, McCurry filed a section 1983 claim for
$1,000,000 in damages against the arresting police officers. McCurry
alleged that the police had conspired to conduct an illegal search of his
home, that the home had been illegally searched, and that certain
police officers had assaulted him upon arrest. The defendant police
officers moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted
their motion on the ground that McCurry had fully litigated the consti-
tutionality of the search of his house in his state suppression hearing
and the issue had been determined adversely to him on the merits. The
37. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-935).
38. 606 F.2d at 797-99.
39. Id. at 796.
1035
1036 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1980:1029
trial court thus held that McCurry was collaterally estopped from as-
serting his claim in the subsequent damage action.40
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Initially,
the court noted that the district court failed to address McCurry's alle-
gation that he had been assaulted by a police officer.41 That this claim
had not been addressed by the court below alone constituted grounds
for reversal. More significantly, however, the court of appeals ac-
knowledged that although the search and seizure aspect of the claim
was "essentially the same claim that was litigated at the suppression
hearing, '42 this identity of issues did not require "the conclusion that
appellant's § 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel."43 The court
reasoned that "because of the special role of federal courts in protecting
civil rights, . . . and because habeas corpus is now unavailable to ap-
pellant [under Stone v. Powe144], it is our duty to consider fully, unen-
cumbered by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appellant's § 1983
claims." 45 Despite that decision, however, the court then decided to
abstain from hearing the case under the rule in Younger v. Harris"6
until direct appeal of McCurry's claim had been completed in the Mis-
souri courts.
4 7
The rejection of collateral estoppel in McCurry is a drastic depar-
ture from prior law.48 Nevertheless, as the McCurry court noted, the
40. This Court will grant defendants' motion on the grounds that the only issue in the
instant lawsuit-whether the entrance into plaintiffs home and the resulting search was
lawful-was litigated on the merits at his criminal trial in state court and determined
adversely to his position. Therefore, plaintiffmay not collaterally attack that determina-
tion and he is collaterally estopped from relitigating the constitutionality of the search.
McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514, 515-16 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rep'd, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-935).
41. 606 F.2d at 797.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Stone Court held that a prisoner's "opportunity for full and fair
litigation" of his fourth amendment claim in state court foreclosed his use of the remedy of federal
habeas corpus. Id. at 482.
45. 606 F.2d at 799 (citations omitted).
46. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger the Supreme Court held that a federal court is prohibited,
absent extraordinary circumstances, from issuing an injunction that would stay a pending state
criminal proceeding for the purpose of litigating federal constitutional issues.
47. 606 F.2d at 799. See note 101 infra.
48. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-
935). The Court has not expressly decided whether collateral estoppel principles must be applied
to section 1983 claims. Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 243 (9th Cir. 1980). In Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), a state prisoner brought a section 1983 claim alleging that his constitu-
tional rights had been violated by the denial of "good time" credits by state officials. The Court
held that the plaintiffs proper remedy was habeas corpus. In distinguishing the habeas remedy
from a civil rights action, the Court stated that "resjudicata has been held [by lower courts] to be
fully applicable to a civil rights action brought under § 1983." Id. at 497. The Court has been
equally noncommittal in other decisions. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18
(1975), the Court stated, "We in no way intend to suggest that. . . the normal rules of res judicata
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judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel must be limited so that
the section 1983 remedy does not become meaningless. In nearly all
cases in which a defendant has had the constitutionality of a search and
seizure determined in a state court suppression hearing, collateral es-
toppel would preclude a subsequent section 1983 damages action in
federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ob-
served:
[I]f a successful state prosecution, based upon the use of information
obtained by violating the defendant's constitutional rights, could bar
a civil rights action against the police for violating his rights, either
by analogy to the law of malicious prosecution or on theories of res
judicata or estoppel by judgement, the Civil Rights Act would, in
many cases, be a dead letter.49
Thus, to maintain the vitality of section 1983 as a federal remedy for
the redress of fourth amendment violations, an exception to the opera-
tion of normal collateral estoppel rules must be made. Congress cre-
ated the remedy as a means of protecting federal constitutional rights
from violations by state officials. Simply because a state trial court has
concluded that a search and seizure conducted by state officials does
not violate the fourth amendment does not compel the conclusion that
a section 1983 action in federal court should not be permitted. Indeed,
Congress enacted section 1983 to provide a federal remedy for situa-
tions in which state judiciaries would not enforce or would inade-
quately enforce federal constitutional rights. The fourth amendment
claimant has no access to a federal forum via habeas corpus in these
circumstances.50 It is therefore imperative to preserve a federal forum
for damage actions pursuant to section 1983 in order to vindicate
fourth amendment rights.
and judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal
issues arising in state court proceedings." In Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 n.12 (1974) the
Court stated, "One would anticipate that normal principles of resjudicala would apply in such
circumstances."
49. Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971). In Ney the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit dealt with an allegation that a state prisoner had been denied his Miranda
rights. The issue had not been litigated in the same court. After his conviction, the defendant
brought a section 1983 action against the arresting officers. The court refused to bar the claim on
the ground of res judicata although the constitutional issue might have been raised in the state
proceeding. Using the precedent of Ney and McCurry, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that a
section 1983 plaintiff whose cause of action is based upon an allegedly illegal search and seizure
will not be barred by collateral estoppel where the fourth amendment issue was previously de-
cided in a state court suppression hearing. Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1980).
50. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
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II. FEDERAL COURTS AS THE PREFERRED FORUM FOR SECTION
1983 ACTIONS
A. The Legislative Purpose of Section 1983.
One of the two reasons 5' the McCurry court relied upon in refus-
ing to bar the section 1983 claim was that federal courts play a special
role in the protection of civil rights.52 At least one Supreme Court Jus-
tice believes that section 1983 is one of the "principal foundations"
upon which Congress, after the Civil War, established the federal court
system as the primary guardian of federal constitutional rights.5 3
The McCurry panel relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitchum v. Foster54 in finding that section 1983 established the lower
federal courts as the primary guardians of rights secured by the Consti-
tution. The Court stated in Mitchum that section 1983 interposed the
federal courts between the states and the people to prevent the denial of
individual constitutional liberties by the action of state officials. 55 In
Mitchum the Court held that a suit in equity to redress the deprivation
of federal constitutional rights under section 1983 is an "expressly au-
thorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 56 which limits the au-
thority of federal courts to stay state court proceedings. 57 The Court
explained that "exceptions must be made to [the Anti-Injunction Act's]
blanket prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts of Congress
are to be given their intended scope.158 After lengthy discussion of the
legislative history of section 1983, the Court concluded that the Civil
Rights Act "opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a
51. The second basis for the court's decision was the unavailability of habeas corpus under
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 606 F.2d at 799.
52. 606 F.2d at 799.
53. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106-07 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The other foundations referred to by Justice Brennan are the federal review of action by state
officials, as permitted by Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and the grant to the federal courts
of federal question jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 1875, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). 401 U.S. at
106-07.
54. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
55. Id. at 242. See generally Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judg-
ment, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 191, 210 (1972); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil RightsAct Cases, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 859, 867 (1976); Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1335 (1977). But see Currie, supra note 24, at 329-30 (criticizing Mitchum).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The statute provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
57. The "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" exception is generally construed very
narrowly. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287
(1970) (exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction).
58. 407 U.S. at 234.
1038 [Vol. 1980:1029
Vol. 1980:1029] § 1983 AND COLLATER4L ESTOPPEL 1039
uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed author-
ity of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the
Nation."59 To give effect to this plainly stated congressional purpose,
the Court accordingly recognized section 1983 as an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act's prohibition.60
The Forty-second Congress was concerned that state tribunals ei-
ther could not or would not adequately protect federally created rights.
This congressional distrust led to the creation of the section 1983 rem-
edy.61 Section 1983 provides an alternative federal remedy for the re-
dress of constitutional violations perpetrated under color of state law.62
59. Id. at 239.
60. Id. at 243. Professor Currie argues that the rationale of Mitchum v. Foster does not indi-
cate that there should be a res judicata or collateral estoppel exception to the full faith and credit
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). Currie, supra note 24, at 329-30. He points out that the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), contains an express provision for situations in which the
Act does not apply. Id. He notes that section 1738 contains no such provision and concludes that
the plain language of that section forbids exceptions to the application of resjudicata or collateral
estoppel. Id. Professor Currie fails to consider, however, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
simply carries out a policy favoring finality ofjudgments. The doctrine is not a hard and fast rule
of substantive law. Section 1738 requires federal courts to apply the res judicata and collateral
estoppel principles of the state in which the initial judgment was rendered, but some federal
courts, notably the Second Circuit, have concluded that even though a judgment may have been
given res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the state court, competing federal policies may
require that the judgment be given lesser effect. See note 28 supra. The "federal courts are not
always bound by such prior state decisions." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp.
468, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1977)). See also
McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1156 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975).
Notwithstanding the language of section 1738, this analysis is consistent with the notion that
res judicata or collateral estoppel principles are applied in the first instance only after balancing
the policy considerations involved. The federal courts thus should be free to consider counter-
vailing federal policies when deciding whether to prevent the relitigation. The policy of providing
a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights under section 1983 is such a policy.
The Supreme Court has noted elsewhere that with the enactment of the civil rights statutes
after the Civil War, the lower federal courts "became the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States."
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIs, THE BUsI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928) (emphasis added by the Court)). The Court held in
Stef9elthat Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), does not require a federal court to stay proceed-
ings when there is only the threat of a state criminal prosecution but no pending state criminal
proceeding as of the date that the federal complaint is filed. 415 U.S. at 475. See also Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 617 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Stefel, 415 U.S. at 464).
61. Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)). The members of the Forty-second Congress were vehement in
their suspicion of the quality and motives of state tribunals. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 374-76 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) ("[The] records of the [state] tribunals are searched
in vain for effective redress [of federally secured rights]. . . . What less than this [the Civil Rights
Act of 1871] will afford an adequate remedy?"), quoted in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240
(1972).
62. Justice Douglas described the fears of the Reconstruction Congress in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961):
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Moreover, Congress perceived that in authorizing the federal courts to
provide this remedy, it was permanently altering the relationship be-
tween the states and the federal government. 63
As noted previously,6 collateral estoppel is a rule of policy and its
application may be superseded by superior competing policies. One
federal judge has stated that "[s]uch a rule of public policy must be
watched in its application lest a blind adherence to it tend to defeat the
even firmer established policy of giving every litigant a full and fair day
in court.165 Decisions since Mitchum 66 that have questioned the pro-
priety of applying collateral estoppel in section 1983 cases have relied
heavily on the legislative purpose behind section 1983-to provide a
federal forum for this uniquely federal remedy.6 7 A blind adherence to
notions of collateral estoppel with respect to section 1983 claims based
on fourth amendment violations will defeat this policy.6 8
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies.
63. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See Averitt, supra note 55, at 208; Theis,
supra note 55, at 867.
64. See note 60 supra and text accompanying note 20 supra.
65. United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 1948) (action for fraud). See Fer-
nandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 856 n.l 1 (1st Cir. 1978) ("modem analysis has tended away
from the technicalities in favor of the purposes of issue and claim preclusion"). Cf. Currie, supra
note 24, at 341 ("[T]he desired result could be reached by redefining 'cause of action' to reflect
modem notions of the underlying policies" of res judicata).
66. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Court correctly notes that a number of lower courts have assumed that the doctrine
of res judicata is fully applicable to cases brought under § 1983. But in view of the
purposes underlying enactment of the [Civil Rights] Act-in particular, the congres-
sional misgivings about the ability and inclination of state courts to enforce federally
protected rights. . .- that conclusion may well be in error.
See also Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1980); McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799
(8th Cir. 1979) (special role of federal courts in protecting civil rights), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
1012 (1980) (No. 79-935); Ornstein v. Regan, 574 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1978) (the court declines
to apply the broader doctrine of res judicata, but does apply collateral estoppel, on the ground that
section 1983 is supplementary to state remedies); Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d
273, 275 (4th Cir. 1977) (Congress is distrustful of state courts); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502
F.2d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1974) (the federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy-to apply
res judicata overrules the essence of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
976 (1975); Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (clear policy of affording
litigants a federal forum); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973) (there is a strong
interest in providing a federal forum).
68. Nonetheless, an exception to the usual collateral estoppel principles is warranted only in
cases in which a litigant was compelled to litigate his federal constitutional claim in a state crimi-
nal prosecution. If the litigant has a choice of forum and chose the state tribunal, there is no valid
reason to permit him to bring the same claim in federal court under an exception to collateral
estoppel premised in the importance of affording a federal forum to hear a litigant's claim. See
Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974). In Parker the
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B. The Inadequacy of the State Forum.
Congress enacted section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 during an unusual period of the nation's history; radical measures
were required to reunite the republic divided in the Civil War. Condi-
tions changed significantly in the century between the enactment of sec-
tion 1983 and the decision in McCurry. Although the Forty-second
Congress's tremendous distrust of state courts is no longer warranted,69
the conclusion that state tribunals are as competent as federal courts to
adjudicate constitutional claims may also be unwarranted. Institu-
tional differences between the state and federal judicial systems70 weigh
heavily in favor of the continued availability of a federal forum for
fourth amendment claims filed pursuant to section 1983.
The sovereignty of states within their own spheres of interest may
promote a provincialism that is not appropriate when federal constitu-
plaintiff had voluntarily sought relief in state court and had received an adverse final judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that he was collaterally estopped from bringing a
section 1983 action in federal court in order to relitigate issues previously determined in the state
action. See also Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969) (federal courts will not
provide a forum in which disgruntled parties can relitigate federal claims), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
951 (1970). But f Tomanio v. Board of Regents, 603 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.) (a constitutional
claim not raised in a prior state proceeding is not barred in federal court by res judicata), rev'don
other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980).
On the other hand, when federal jurisdiction is properly invoked, the litigant's choice of a
federal forum should be respected. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (it is the duty
of a federal court to respect a litigant's choice of a federal forum); England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (fundamental objections to forcing a litigant who
has properly invoked federal court jurisdiction to accept a state court judgment).
69. One federal judge has noted that "[ilt would be presumptuous to claim that federal
judges are more competent, conscientious, or learned than their state brethren in the area of fed-
eral rights." Lay, Modern Administrative Proposalsfor Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Pris-
oners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701, 716 (1972).
In Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1977), the court reached a similar conclusion, stating: "Turco, as appellees did in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd. [420 U.S. 592 (1975)]. . ., is 'urging [the Court] to base a rule on the assumption that
state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities.' And like the Supreme
Court, '[t]his we refuse to do.'" 554 F.2d at 520 (quoting 420 U.S. at 611). See also Deane Hill
Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321, 325 (6th Cir. 1967) ("State courts are
competent to decide questions arising under the federal constitution"); Aldisert, Judicial Expan-
sion 0/Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 557.
One commentator, noting the uniform pattern that the Burger Court has followed in limiting
access to the federal courts, has suggested that the state courts assume the task of protecting feder-
ally secured rights. See Comment, Protecting Fundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State
Peg into a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 63, 87 (1977). This solution is somewhat
shortsighted, however. The problem of protecting federal constitutional rights is not solved by
forcing the state courts to fill the gap left by the Burger Court's reduction of federal judicial power,
but by maintaining and strengthening section 1983 as a viable remedy.
70. For a good discussion of such differences see Neubome, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1977).
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tional claims are being adjudicated.7' Although federal courts some-
times determine questions of state law, and state courts occasionally
determine questions of federal law, each judicial system is most compe-
tent in its own field. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton ob-
served that
the most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local
spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdic-
tion of national causes. . . . State judges, holding their offices dur-
ing pleasure from year to year, will be too little independent to be
relied on for an inflexible execution of the national laws.72
Justice Brennan, who has served on both the New Jersey and the
United States Supreme Courts, has stated that "[m]y state court respon-
sibility, while it included jurisdiction over federal questions and fed-
eral-state conflicts, was inevitably colored by the fact that I was, after
all, a state judge. My federal court responsibility, on the other hand,
demands a national perspective. .... ,,73
A member of the state judiciary, regardless of his individual tal-
ents,74 is, as Brennan implies, likely to be more influenced by local con-
cerns than is a federal judge. State trial judges may lack the necessary
national perspective for adequate resolution of problems of constitu-
tional dimension. Members of the state bench at the criminal, domestic
relations, and civil court levels are "steadily confronted by distasteful
and troubling fact patterns which can sorely test abstract constitutional
doctrine and foster a jaded attitude toward constitutional rights." 75 An
obvious example arises in the fourth amendment context. A state judge
may be faced with a choice between sanctioning a fourth amendment
violation and applying the exclusionary rule. Application of the exclu-
sionary rule often permits an otherwise guilty and dangerous felon to
go free. A state judge who believes that enforcement of fourth amend-
ment rights through the exclusionary rule is socially harmful and un-
71. But see Stone v. Powel, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976):
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to fed-
eral constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume
that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in
the trial and appellate courts of the several States.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton). See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REV. 250, 262-63
(1974).
73. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 948 (1964).
74. Professor Neuborne contends that the average federal judge is technically more compe-
tent to adjudicate constitutional issues than is the average state judge. Neuborne, supra note 70, at
1121-24.
75. Id. 1125.
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just may be less eager to vindicate constitutional principles than his
federal counterpart.76
Furthermore, state courts are not part of a unified judicial system,
as are the federal courts. A state court decision on federal constitu-
tional issues therefore has minimal precedential value. The unified
federal judiciary is better equipped to provide a uniform and high stan-
dard of protection to rights guaranteed by the Constitution.77 More-
over, the Supreme Court can review state court judgments in only a
small percentage of cases-an inadequate means of assuring that con-
stitutional principles are consistently and uniformly applied. 78
C. Adverse Effects of Collateral Estoppel on State Court Defendants.
The application of collateral estoppel against a section 1983 plain-
tiff who has unsuccessfully litigated his fourth amendment claims in a
prior state suppression hearing does more than merely deny him access
to a federal forum. The threat of collateral estoppel adversely affects
the state criminal defendant even before he sets foot in the courtroom,
because he must choose between two dangerous and unattractive alter-
natives. He may forego his constitutional defenses in the state proceed-
ing in order to preserve them for a subsequent section 1983 action. In
this case, the defendant increases the risk of a criminal conviction. Al-
ternatively, the defendant may raise all potential constitutional issues
at his state trial. This option has two distinct disadvantages. First, if he
is convicted in the state trial, the defendant loses the federal forum that
section 1983 supposedly secures for him. Second, by raising constitu-
tional defenses the defendant may complicate his state trial and impair
his efforts to mount an effective defense strategy on the merits of his
case. 79 The state criminal defendant is thus faced with the prospect of
an adverse criminal judgment on the one hand, or the denial of his
76. See McCormack, supra note 72, at 262-64; Note, supra note 55, at 1340.
77. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965). The court stated: "We believe that
the benefits of the [Civil Rights] Acts were intended to be uniform throughout the United States,
that the protection to the individual to be afforded by them was not intended by Congress to differ
from state to state .... "
78. Comment, supra note 69, at 87.
79. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court indicated that the application of the
exclusionary rule detracts from the litigation of the substantive issues: "[T]he focus of the trial,
and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 489-90.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) makes it likely that the parties will place great
emphasis on the fourth amendment issue. That rule requires a defendant to file a motion to
suppress evidence in advance of trial, thus avoiding interruption of the trial's orderly progress.
See Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1927). Because the accused will often be
acquitted if the relevant evidence is excluded, both parties will view a victory on the fourth
amendment issue as critically important.
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federal forum on the other. One federal court has noted that the de-
fendant caught in this dilemma is faced with little choice at all.80
D. Summary.
Even if state courts are adequately equipped to adjudicate federal
constitutional claims, it cannot be concluded that a federal forum is no
longer necessary or desirable for the adjudication of section 1983 ac-
tions. A basic premise of section 1983 is that the plaintiff who alleges a
denial of federally secured rights by state instrumentalities has a right
to have his claim adjudicated in a federal forum.81 Congress has not
changed its policy of providing a federal forum for section 1983 actions
simply because state judicial systems have improved their capacity and
willingness to litigate federal constitutional claims. Indeed, the pro-
posed Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1979 provides: "In evaluating
the need for relief under this Act, no court of the United States shall
consider the availability of a remedy under the laws, ordinances, or
regulations of any State, territory, subdivision thereof, or the District of
Columbia. ' 82 Moreover, this proposed legislation expressly provides
that merger and bar should apply to section 1983 actions only when the
plaintiff voluntarily instituted the prior action.8 3 Thus, nonapplication
of collateral estoppel to a section 1983 action that follows a state crimi-
nal proceeding in which the section 1983 plaintiff was an involuntary
party complies with this provision. Should the Civil Rights Improve-
ment Act of 1979 be enacted, this clearly expressed congressional policy
regarding the scope of the section 1983 remedy would override the ju-
dicially imposed bar of collateral estoppel. This legislation evidences
an intent by at least some members of the Congress to preserve section
1983 as a federal remedy available in a federal forum.
Justice Brennan has eloquently stated the relevant policy favoring
the availability of a federal forum:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard
individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protec-
tive role of the federal judiciary. But in so doing, it has forgotten
that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a
80. Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("If traditional concepts of collat-
eral estoppel apply, then, a state defendant is faced with a Hobson's choice"). See Note, supra
note 55, at 1340.
81. See Zwicklerv. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,248 (1967) (it is the duty of a federal court to respect
a litigant's choice of a federal forum); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (fundamental objection to forcing a litigant to accept a state court judgment
when the jurisdiction of a federal court is properly invoked).
82. S. 1983, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1979).
83. Id. § 2(0(3).
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double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism
is not served when the federal half of that protection is crippled. 84
The availability of a federal forum for section 1983 actions thus re-
mains a vital policy objective. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
should not apply where it would defeat the strong policy of providing a
federal forum for section 1983 actions.
In a related context, the federal courts have declined to apply res
judicata or collateral estoppel when there is a strong indication of con-
gressional intent to provide a federal forum for certain causes of action.
Specifically, the federal courts will not bar relitigation of the cause of
action on the ground of res judicata or collateral estoppel when Con-
gress has granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in certain
antitrust litigation.85 If res judicata or collateral estoppel would
threaten the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws by denying ac-
cess to the federal system, the courts refuse to apply the doctrines. Am-
ple precedent thus exists for an exception to the operation of collateral
estoppel when fourth amendment claims are being heard pursuant to
section 1983. Certainly, the need for enforcement of fourth amend-
ment rights is at least as compelling as the need for enforcement of
antitrust prohibitions.8 6
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF COMITY
The principle that underlies the doctrine of comity is that the
courts of one sovereign should give effect to the laws and judicial deci-
sions of another sovereign, out of deference and mutual respect rather
than out of a sense of obligation. The Supreme Court has noted that
comity reflects
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments,
and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.87
84. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 502-03 (1977).
85. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.) (no res judicata when a federal
plaintiff was a state court defendant), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); see Note, supra note 28.
See also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 468, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (res judicata
not applied to title VII action).
86. Although the federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over section 1983 actions,
the congressional policy of providing a federal remedy for the denial of constitutional rights by
state authorities is certainly strong enough to support an analogous exception to the operation of
collateral estoppel. One commentator has noted that the framers of section 1983 probably consid-
ered the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts in section 1983 actions to be of little practical
importance. See Theis, supra note 55, at 868.
87. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977) (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,
601 (1975) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))).
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel promotes comity by prohibiting liti-
gation in federal court of issues that were previously adjudicated in a
state court.88 When a section 1983 damage action follows a state crimi-
nal conviction, however, the concerns that the concept of comity ad-
dresses are not seriously implicated.
A. Comity Considerations in McCurry v. Allen. 89
Although the McCurry court held that the plaintiff was not collat-
erally estopped by the determination at the state suppression hearing, it
nevertheless ordered the district court to abstain from adjudicating Mc-
Curry's section 1983 claim until completion of the state appellate proc-
ess.90 The court based its decision to abstain on a line of cases
beginning with Younger v. Harris.91 In Younger the Supreme Court
held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal prose-
cution except in certain exceptional circumstances. 92 The Court stated
that the underlying reason for restraining federal courts from enjoining
pending state criminal prosecutions is the notion of comity-the need
to respect the exercise of state functions.93 Deference is to be accorded
to the state criminal process unless extraordinary circumstances render
the state court incapable of fully and fairly adjudicating the federal
issues before it.94
The Burger Court has steadily and consistently expanded the
Younger rule. The Court first extended Younger to a state civil nui-
sance action, on the theory that such an action is analogous to the en-
forcement of a criminal prohibition.95 Next, the Court applied the
Younger abstention doctrine to state civil contempt proceedings; 96
later, the Court forbade federal courts to enjoin the operation of a state
attachment statute.97 Finally, in Moore v. Sims,98 the Court announced
88. Vestal, Res Judicata/lreclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1739 (1968); Comment, supra note 19, at 96.
89. 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No. 79-935).
90. 606 F.2d at 799.
91. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
92. Id. Federal injunctive intervention in a pending state proceeding may be permissible if
irreparable injury is "both great and immediate," id. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240, 243 (1926)); if the state statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions," 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)); or if there is
proof of bad faith, harassment, or "any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable
relief," 401 U.S. at 54.
93. 401 U.S. at 44.
94. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (reversing a federal court injunction staying a
pending state criminal proceeding).
95. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
96. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
97. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
98. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). The Burger Court consistently has limited the power of the federal
judiciary to intrude upon the affairs of the states. See Cox, Federalism and Indipidual Rights Under
1046 [Vol. 1980:1029
Vol. 1980:1029] § 1983 AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 1047
a broad extension of the Younger doctrine to civil proceedings involv-
ing important state interests.
The Supreme Court has not held that the Younger abstention doc-
trine applies to damage actions. 99 Currently, the doctrine is limited to
the prohibition of federal injunctions that stay pending state civil or
criminal proceedings.100 In McCurry, however, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit believed it "appropriate to temporarily abstain
until the Missouri courts have had the opportunity to directly review
appellant's conviction and the underlying search of his home."' 0' In
the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1978); Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger
Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REV. 233 (1979). The
majority of the Court has apparently perceived that the potential displacement of the state courts
by the federal courts poses a threat to the federal system. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 423.
This trend toward extensive limitations on the power of the federal judiciary is a radical
departure from the philosophy of the Warren Court and the principles enunciated in Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum the Court reaffirmed the federal courts' role as the pri-
mary guardians of federal constitutional rights. The change in attitude of the Burger Court is
illustrated by the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court has stated that the policy of forbidding
federal injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions is "founded on the premise that ordi-
narily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindi-
cation of federal constitutional rights." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (reversing a
federal court injunction staying a pending state criminal proceeding). See generally Morrison,
Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Pro-
tecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 841, 841-42 (1977); Zeigler, An Accommodation of the
Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the
State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266 (1976); Comment, supra note 69, at 63-66.
99. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1977). The Court limited its holding, stating:
"The issue of damages is therefore not before us, and we intimate no opinion as to the applicabil-
ity of Younger-Huffman principles to a § 1983 suit seeking only such relief in the District Court."
Id See Zurek v. Woodbury, 446 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
100. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
101. 606 F.2d at 799. After persuasively arguing that the operation of collateral estoppel
threatens the effectiveness of the federal remedy provided by section 1983, the court denied the
appellant access to that remedy by requiring the district court to abstain until the state appellate
process had been completed.
Apparently, the McCurry panel believed that considerations of comity could best be served
by requiring the plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before seeking section 1983 relief. Exhaustion
is required in the related context of federal habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). Ex-
haustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but is founded on the more flexible principles of com-
ity. Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (citing Ballard v. Maggio, 544
F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1977)). The requirement that one exhaust state remedies before invoking the
federal habeas remedy gives the state judicial system an opportunity to correct its own error.
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
State judicial remedies need not be exhausted in section 1983 actions; the section 1983 rem-
edy supplements the state remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd in part on other
grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). "[T]he state remedy need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. at 183. The McCurry
court's requirement that state remedies be exhausted prior to the institution of a section 1983
action in federal court is therefore inappropriate. Furthermore, federal abstention until the state
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ordering the district court to abstain from hearing the appellant's sec-
tion 1983 damage action, the court of appeals went further than was
necessary or warranted. The principles of comity that underlie the
Younger doctrine are not implicated when a federal court, in a section
1983 damage action, adjudicates issues that were previously deter-
mined in a state proceeding from which an appeal is pending.
B. Collateral Estoppel and the Comity Doctrine.
The evil sought to be remedied in Younger was the direct interfer-
ence with ongoing state judicial proceedings. 102 An injunction that
stays a pending proceeding greatly interferes with the enforcement of
substantive state policies. A section 1983 damage action that re-exam-
ines issues of fact and law raised in the prior proceeding, however, does
not interfere with the implementation of such policies.'0 3 A damage
action filed pursuant to section 1983, as in McCurry, does not impinge
on the determination of guilt or innocence made in the state criminal
trial. The issue of the constitutionality of a search and seizure does not
go to the merits of the conviction or acquittal. Moreover, a determina-
tion in a section 1983 action that a search and seizure violated the
fourth amendment would not necessarily require the exclusionary rule
to be invoked retroactively. Although the exclusionary rule is currently
utilized to enforce the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has inti-
mated that it is not a constitutionally required device for enforcing
fourth amendment rights. °4 The Court has heavily criticized the ex-
clusionary rule and has indicated that if a viable alternative remedy for
fourth amendment violations were available, the exclusionary rule
would be promptly discarded. 0 5 Federal determination of fourth
amendment violations pursuant to a section 1983 damage action should
appellate court renders a decision may threaten the integrity and dignity of the state court more
than if the district court hears the case before the state appellate process is completed. Thus, there
is no valid reason for the federal court to abstain on the basis of comity considerations.
102. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971). The Court, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926), stated that "[o]rdinarily, there should be no interference with such [state]
officers; primarily, they are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the
State and must decide when and how this is to be done." 401 U.S. at 45. See generally Aldisert,
On Being Ciil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181 (1979).
103. One district court has held that
[a]lthough federalism is an important restraint on the exercise of discretionary jurisdic-
tion by the federal courts, in light of the minimal interference with the state criminal
proceeding, the clear policy of affording litigants a federal forum in which to vindicate
constitutional rights represented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . and the doubts which this
Court entertains with respect to its power to decline to exercise its jurisdiction, the Court
will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss this action on the basis of comity.
Clark v. Lutcher, 436 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
104. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
105. Id. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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therefore not automatically trigger the exclusionary rule. A section
1983 damage award after a state criminal conviction would not impugn
the validity or integrity of the state court conviction, or demean the
state's important interest in enforcing its criminal law. The conviction
would remain valid, but section 1983 would afford the defendant an
opportunity to vindicate his fourth amendment rights. Thus, the poli-
cies that underlie the doctrine of comity are not subverted by the recog-
nition of an exception to collateral estoppel that permits section 1983
damage actions following state criminal prosecutions.
The possibility that a federal court may reach a result different
from that reached by the state court on the fourth amendment issue
does not impinge upon considerations of comity or federalism. Such
conflicting results are a necessary consequence of our federal system.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this principle in Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc. 10 6 In Doran three business establishments brought a section 1983
action to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance proscribing topless
dancing. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated the plain-
tiffs' first and fourteenth amendment rights, but only one of the three
corporations had actually violated the criminal ordinance. Because a
state criminal prosecution was pending against this corporation,
Younger abstention would normally have prevented a federal court
from granting injunctive relief. The Younger rule did not, however,
operate against the two businesses that had not violated the ordinance.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that this distinc-
tion was unwarranted in view of the interests of avoiding contradictory
outcomes, conserving judicial energy, and maintaining a consistent
method for determining when federal courts should defer to state pros-
ecutions.' 0 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"the interest of avoiding conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar
issues, while entitled to substantial deference in a unitary system, must
of necessity be subordinated to the claims of federalism in this particu-
lar area of the law."10 8 The state court could therefore find the ordi-
nance constitutional and convict the corporation that had violated the
ordinance even though the federal court might grant the other two cor-
porations declaratory or injunctive relief if it determined in the section
1983 action that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
Similarly, collateral estoppel need not be used to prevent federal
and state courts from reaching inconsistent results (although inconsis-
106. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
107. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nor Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
108. 422 U.S. at 928.
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tencies are obviously undesirable) in cases arising out of the same facts.
Federalism does not demand that results be consistent when two in-
dependent judicial systems are involved. Moreover, federalism pro-
tects federal interests as well as state interests. If state interests were at
all times supreme, the concept of a federal union would become mean-
ingless.
C. Independent Constitutional Inquiry in Federal Prosecutions.
A person charged with a violation of state law may be subject to a
state criminal prosecution and a federal prosecution based on the same
facts. The defendant may, in the state criminal prosecution, be success-
ful in his motion to suppress evidence upon allegations that the police
searched for and seized evidence in violation of his fourth amendment
rights. In this case the defendant is likely to win a judgment of acquit-
tal, for the prosecution often cannot prove the elements of the offense
without the seized evidence. If a federal grand jury subsequently in-
dicts the defendant for federal offenses that arise out of the same facts
litigated in the state proceeding, 0 9 he may again move to suppress the
evidence. Considerations of comity might seem to require that the fed-
eral court accept the finding of the state court. It is well settled, how-
ever, that the federal judge must conduct an independent inquiry to
determine whether the state police officers violated the fourth amend-
ment.1 0 Comity and federalism do not compel the federal judge to
accept the finding of the state court on the fourth amendment issue
because independent inquiry into the same facts and issues of law does
not seriously interfere with the operation of the state criminal justice
system. Moreover, the important interest in enforcing the federal crim-
109. A federal prosecution arising out of the same facts which resulted in an earlier state court
conviction does not violate principles of double jeopardy. An act "denounced as a crime by both
national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
punished by each. . . . The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same act
. .. " United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); accord, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
129 (1959).
110. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). The Court stated:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state of-
ficers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been
such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have
turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may
have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.
Id. In Elkins the Court overruled the "silver platter" doctrine, which had permitted the federal
government to use evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the fourth amendment as
long as federal agents had not participated in the search. Id See also Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960); United States v. Garrett, 565 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974
(1978); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 (3d Cir. 1975); Boyle v. United States, 395
F.2d 413, 415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1089 (1968); United States v. Beigel, 370 F.2d 751,
756 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967); vuin v. Burton, 327 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1964).
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inal law requires the federal court to readjudicate fourth amendment
questions.
This rule implies that a federal court should also make an in-
dependent inquiry in a section 1983 suit for damages that follows a
state criminal proceeding."'I Many of the same conditions are present
in both situations. First, the vindication of an important federal inter-
est is at stake-the provision of a federal forum to adjudicate allega-
tions that the state has deprived an individual of constitutional rights.
Second, a section 1983 damage action will neither interfere with sub-
stantive state policies nor impugn the integrity of the prior state judg-
ment. Although collateral estoppel is often invoked to promote comity
and federalism, a section 1983 damage action for fourth amendment
violations that follows a state prosecution does not seriously implicate
those concerns. On balance, the scale certainly tips in favor of provid-
ing an exception to the application of collateral estoppel.
IV. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF HABEAS CORPUS: Stone v. Powell
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy, based upon traditions
anchored in the common law and the Constitution, for detentions that
are fundamentally illegal."12 Habeas relief has traditionally been avail-
able in federal courts to a state prisoner whose constitutional claims
have been rejected by the state courts.' 3 The remedy is available,
however, only when all avenues of relief under state law have been
exhausted. State prisoners are entitled to federal habeas corpus relief
only upon proof that their imprisonment violates fundamental personal
liberties that the United States Constitution protects." 4
The writ of habeas corpus has generally been exempt from strict
application of res judicata principles.' '5 The reason for this exemption
111. The analogy is admittedly imperfect. In a federal prosecution subsequent to a state pros-
ecution, there is no possibility that the United States is collaterally estopped from relitigating
issues raised in the state suppression hearing. The United States was not a party to the state
criminal action, and "it is fundamental that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
must be a party or privy to the initial litigation." United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202 (4th
Cir. 1971) (citing Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953)). See e.g., Ferina v. United
States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965). Nevertheless, the important point
remains: the federal court does not accept or defer to the state court's determination because of
comity.
112. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963). When a state prisoner's application to a
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief,
the federal court can conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing.
113. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1050, 1053-54 (1978).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
115. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). According to the Court, "the state adjudication
carries the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another
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is that habeas corpus is an original civil remedy for the enforcement of
the right to personal liberty independent of prior criminal proceedings
or appellate review."t 6 This independence promotes the policy that
"conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest oppor-
tunity for plenary judicial review." 1 7
Federal habeas relief, however, is now rarely available to a state
prisoner alleging a violation of his fourth amendment rights. In Stone
v. Powell,"8 the United States Supreme Court held:
[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not re-
quire that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial."19
Before Stone, if the federal court in a habeas action determined that the
state court had admitted evidence at trial that was obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment, the prisoner would be released. 20 In Slone,
however, the Court weighed the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
against the social costs of extending it to collateral review of fourth
amendment claims.' 2 ' The Court concluded that the social costs of
providing habeas corpus review in the case of alleged fourth amend-
ment violations were too high. 22
The Stone v. Powell decision leaves section 1983 as the only vehi-
cle for federal oversight of violations of fourth amendment rights by
state officials. A strict application of collateral estoppel to a section
1983 damage action would therefore effectively bar a fourth amend-
jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues. It is not resjudicala." Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) (res
judicata is not wholly applicable in a habeas proceeding).
116. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 423-24.
117. Id. at 424.
118. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
119. Id. at 482.
120. Id. at 480-81.
121. Id. at 489.
122. Id. at 493-94. The Court explained:
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no innocent
person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions important
to our system of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of
friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the
constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
d. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). The Court also noted other significant costs of applying the exclusionary rule, such as the
interruption of the truth-finding process and the freeing of guilty defendants if a fourth amend-
ment violation is found. 428 U.S. at 490.
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ment claimant from all avenues of federal relief. In McCurry the
court's second 23 major rationale for refusing to preclude the section
1983 claimant was the unavailability of habeas corpus under Stone. In
fact, many of the cases applying collateral estoppel to section 1983
claims brought by state prisoners indicate that the availability of fed-
eral review via the writ of habeas corpus is a necessary condition prece-
dent to a bar of collateral estoppel. 24
In Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Department, 25  decided after
Stone, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit barred a section
1983 action by a prisoner who alleged that the state court had unconsti-
tutionally admitted certain identification testimony at trial.' 26 Signifi-
cantly, the court applied collateral estoppel only after noting that the
issues raised by the plaintiff could be raised in federal court on a peti-
tion for habeas corpus.1 27 The court also expressed serious doubts
about the propriety of applying collateral estoppel when federal habeas
corpus is, under Stone, unavailable to the prisoner. The court noted
that state prisoners complaining of illegal searches and seizures would
have no access to the federal courts by way of habeas corpus, and that
application of the rule of preclusion in such cases might deny a state
prisoner access to a federal forum entirely.128 The court concluded that
"[s]ince it was the general intention of the Civil Rights Act to provide
access to a federal forum for the adjudication of federal constitutional
rights, the Civil Rights Act itself may present a bar to foreclosure of the
issue in those cases." 129 The Rimmer court's limitation on the effect of
123. The court's first rationale was the special role that the federal courts play in protecting
constitutional rights. 606 F.2d at 799. See text accompanying notes 51-68 supra.
124. See, ag., Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1977) (foreclo-
sure of habeas under Stone raises a problem in applying collateral estoppel); Meadows v. Evans,
550 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting) (the absence of habeas
raises troublesome questions). Cases decided before Stone, and assuming habeas relief was avail-
able, include Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (habeas corpus is
generally available), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Brazzel v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1974) (collateral estoppel should be applied because of the availability of habeas corpus); Alexan-
der v. Emerson, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (habeas corpus rather than section 1983
is the proper remedy for a claim based on the fourth amendment); Von Lusch v. C & P Telephone
Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978) (the plaintiff was precluded because he could raise the
issues on federal habeas corpus); Pyles v. Keane, 418 F. Supp. 269, 274 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (col-
lateral estoppel does not bar an attack by habeas corpus); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88
(E.D. Va. 1973) (the court doubts the propriety of applying collateral estoppel where habeas
corpus is not available).
125. 567 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1977).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 277. See Von Lusch v. C & P Telephone Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978).
128. 567 F.2d at 276.
129. Id.
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collateral estoppel thus emphasizes the importance of preserving some
federal forum for the fourth amendment claimant. 30
A. The Social Cost Rationale of Stone.
The Supreme Court concluded in Stone that ordinarily a state
court determination of fourth amendment claims is adequate and
should preclude federal habeas corpus relief.'3' In essence, therefore,
Stone holds that the traditional exception of habeas corpus from res
judicata or collateral estoppel no longer applies in the fourth amend-
ment context.132 Stone might similarly prohibit an exception to the op-
eration of collateral estoppel when a claimant seeks review of a search
and seizure pursuant to section 1983. Arguably, if the strong interest in
personal liberty does not justify the social costs of providing habeas
relief, then the interest in vindicating fourth amendment rights through
a section 1983 damage action does not warrant incurring such social
costs. 133 This conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow from
Stone. Stone holds only that enforcement of the exclusionary rule via
federal habeas corpus is too costly, not that a violation of the fourth
amendment is an inferior or trivial infringement of individual rights.
The case stands for the proposition that the exclusionary rule is not
always an appropriate remedy for fourth amendment violations. t34
The Supreme Court's apparent dissatisfaction with the exclusion-
130. Id. Von Lusch v. C & P Telephone Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978).
131. 428 U.S. at 481-82.
132. Federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable if the fourth amendment claimant has had an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his claim in state court. Id.
133. Both commentators and courts have likened habeas corpus to section 1983. See, e.g.,
Florida State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960 (1971) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for certiorari); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissent-
ing); McCormack, supra note 72, at 259; Theis, supra note 55, at 872-73. Both remedies help to
vindicate constitutional principles. Significantly, habeas corpus, like section 1983, is generally
available regardless of the guilt or innocence of the applicant. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 492 n.31 (1976) (questioning the soundness of habeas corpus when the matter at issue has "no
bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration").
There are important differences, however. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that
recognizes the paramount importance of personal liberty. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 423-24. A
damage action under section 1983 essentially sounds in tort and does not have the urgent purpose
of limiting wrongful restraints on personal liberty that habeas corpus has. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421
U.S. 426, 440 n.6 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In my view, the harm asserted in habeas corpus
proceedings-restraint on liberty-may justify a broader scope of collateral attack than would the
kinds of injury normally concerned in actions under § 1983"). See also Note, The Preclusive Effect
of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 610, 621 (1978).
134. Some courts have interpreted Stone as a denial of the habeas remedy to redress any
constitutional violations that do not bear on the basic guilt or innocence of the prisoner. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (applying the Stone "opportunity for
full and fair litigation" standard to a fifth amendment claim on petition for habeas corpus). See
generally United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 1141-44 (N.D. Il1. 1978)
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ary rule1 35 does not mean that an effective federal remedy for such in-
fringements is either unnecessary or undesirable. Concurring in Stone,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that abolition of the exclusionary rule
would force Congress and the state legislatures to develop more effec-
tive remedies for fourth amendment violations.' 36 In fact, the Me-
Curry 13 7 court read the Chief Justice's concurring opinion expansively
and conjectured that one justification for "rendering habeas corpus un-
available" in fourth amendment cases was that alternative remedies
were still open to the petitioner. 38 The section 1983 damage remedy is
an obvious alternative; it compensates the victim of an illegal search
and seizure without the harmful effect of releasing a guilty felon and
has a deterrent effect as well. 139
(discussing the possible application of Stone to fifth and sixth amendment claims). But see id. at
1146 (refusing to extend Stone to fifth and sixth amendment claims).
The Supreme Court repudiated this view of Stone, however, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 560-61 (1979). The Court held that federal habeas corpus was properly invoked upon proof
that racial discrimination existed in the process of grand jury selection, despite the fact that the
defendants had been properly convicted in a trial free from constitutional error. Id But see id. at
579 (Powell, J., concurring): Justice Powell, who authored the Stone opinion, argued in his Rose
concurrence that as the prisoners had been found guilty at trial the collateral attack on an issue
unrelated to guilt constituted an abuse of federal habeas corpus.
135. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). In dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated, "Although I would hesitate to abandon it until
some meaningful substitute is developed, the history of the suppression doctrine [the exclusionary
rule] demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective in accomplishing
its stated objective." Id. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976). In Janis, the Court stated:
In the past this Court has opted for exclusion in the anticipation that law enforce-
ment officers would be deterred from violating Fourth Amendment rights. Then, as
now, the Court acted in the absence of convincing empirical evidence and relied, instead,
on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various compo-
nents of the law enforcement system. In the situation before us, we do not find sufficient
justification for the drastic measure of an exclusionary rule. There comes a point at
which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create
barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty
of the Executive and Legislative Branches. We find ourselves at that point in this case.
Id. at 459.
See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). In Rose, the Court refused to apply Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to a federal habeas proceeding which alleged that the state discrimi-
nated against certain minorities in the selection of a grand jury. The Court concluded that "a
claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury differs so fundamentally from applica-
tion on habeas of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that the reasoning of Stone v. Powell
should not be extended to foreclose habeas review of such claims in Federal court." 443 U.S. at
560-61. Thus, the Court distinguished between a claim of racial discrimination on habeas and the
minimal value of the exclusionary rule as applied in habeas proceedings. Id. at 559-64.
136. 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
137. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980) (No.
79-935).
138. 606 F.2d at 799.
139. See text accompanying notes 163-68 infra. The effectiveness of section 1983, however, is
significantly limited by judicially imposed immunities and defenses. See note 168 infra. But see
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B. Fourth Amendment Rights Not Enforced Under Stone.
In addition to denying a federal forum to the victim of state-
inflicted fourth amendment violations, Stone reduces the probability
that a violation of the fourth amendment will be redressed. In Wolff v.
Rice,140 a companion case to Stone, the state court had upheld the con-
stitutionality of a search despite the fact that the search warrant the
police used to gain entry to the petitioner's home was clearly invalid.
The Supreme Court, applying the "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion"'14 test, refused to consider the merits of the claim. The implica-
tion of Stone and Wolffis that as long as the accused has had a full and
fair hearing in the state court, a federal court may not review the fourth
amendment claim even though the state court's decision is plainly
wrong. 142 Federal courts reviewing petitions for habeas corpus are thus
limited to determining whether the petitioner had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state court. Viola-
tors of fourth amendment rights may go unpunished and their victims
uncompensated when state courts make erroneous determinations at
suppression hearings or on appeal.
The continued need for federal review of fourth amendment
claims is apparent in view of the limitations of Stone and in view of
evidence that state court systems continue to make erroneous decisions
on fourth amendment issues. In light of Stone, section 1983 is the only
available way to achieve effective federal review of fourth amendment
claims.143 Strict application of collateral estoppel to fourth amendment
claims filed pursuant to section 1983 may foreclose all federal judicial
remedies to the litigant.
V. REMEDIES FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
An effective remedy for violations of the fourth amendment by
state officials is necessary. Such a remedy should further two goals:
first, it should deter future violations of the fourth amendment; second,
it should compensate the victim of fourth amendment abuse for his
Owens v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980) (a municipality is liable in damages under
section 1983 when municipal officials violate constitutional rights). Thus, the Court may be in the
process of withdrawing broad grants of immunity from section 1983 liability.
140. 428 U.S. 465, 473 (1976).
141. Id. at 481-82.
142. Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977); see
Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977); Note, Habeas CorpusAfter Stone v. Powell: the
"O'pporrunityforfull andfair litigation" Standard, 13 HARe. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 521, 533-40 (1978).
143. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
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injuries. 44 Unlike the exclusionary rule, a section 1983 damage rem-
edy would serve both objectives well-provided that access to the rem-
edy is not barred by the operation of collateral estoppel.
A. The Nature of the Fourth Amendment Right.
The fourth amendment protects a person's privacy against unwar-
ranted state intrusion. In Katz v. United States 45 the Supreme Court
established that the amendment "protects people, not places."' 46 That
is, the fourth amendment protects a right personal to the individual,
rather than a property right. This principle recognizes that an individ-
ual has qualities that are not derived in any way from the state, such as
his "personality." Some aspects of personality are public, but some are
private. A primary function of law is to preserve those private aspects
of personality from undesired and unwarranted intrusion and disclo-
sure. 147 Thus, the fourth amendment forbids state intrusion into the
private aspects of personality by prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures.
One commentator has noted two divergent views of the nature of
the right that the fourth amendment protects. 48 This commentator
asks "whether the amendment should be viewed as a collection of pro-
tections of atomistic spheres of interest of individual citizens or as a
regulation of governmental conduct."' 149 The choice may very well dic-
tate the remedy that courts should use to prevent and redress violations
of the fourth amendment.
Katz and other Supreme Court cases seem to support the view that
the fourth amendment does not merely require government officials to
act in a reasonable manner, but also protects the right to personal pri-
vacy. 150 Accordingly, a viable and effective remedy for fourth amend-
144. The Court has recognized that monetary relief is a remedy available to the victim of an
unconstitutional search or seizure. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971) (a violation of the fourth amendment by federal agents
gives rise to a cause of action for damages under that amendment). Bivens, who never went to
trial, never received the benefit of the exclusionary rule.
145. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic surveillance of a phone conversation in a public phone
booth, without a proper search warrant, violates the fourth amendment).
146. Id. at 351.
147. Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
and Fofh Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 985 (1977).
148. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 367 (1974).
149. Id. 367.
150. The Court has stated that the "basic purpose of [the fourth] Amendment ... is to safe-
guard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), quoted in Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 504 (1978). See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in which the Court dealt with
pretrial detainees' fourth amendment objections to visual searches of body cavities and jail cells.
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ment abuse should not only deter and prevent official misconduct but
also compensate the victim of an illegal search and seizure for the vio-
lation of his personal privacy.
B. The Exclusionary Rule.
The exclusionary rule is currently the major weapon used to en-
force the fourth amendment. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of the
right guaranteed by the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule is an
inadequate remedy for violations of the fourth amendment. No sub-
stantial evidence indicates that exclusion of evidence effectively deters
police misconduct. Moreover, the exclusionary rule does not compen-
sate victims of fourth amendment abuse. The guilty felon who is freed
by operation of the exclusionary rule is "compensated," but this result
is both socially and conceptually unacceptable, and does not compen-
sate at all the truly innocent victim.' 5 '
1. The Deterrent Effects Are Outweighed by Social Costs. The
Supreme Court has stated that the primary purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in forbidden
conduct. 152 The rule is calculated to prevent fourth amendment viola-
tions, not to redress injuries caused by such violations. 53 And there is
doubt that the rule is at all effective. Professor Oaks, who has compiled
the most comprehensive and often-cited empirical study 54 of the effec-
tiveness of the exclusionary rule, offers the following analysis:
[I]t is apparent that the principal current argument for the exclusion-
ary rule is a factual one: exclusion of evidence obtained by illegal
means will deter law enforcement officials from illegal behavior. "It
is a logical enough theory, impregnable in the library." But a factu-
Upholding the validity of such searches, the Court noted that the fourth amendment's test of
reasonableness requires a weighing of the need for the search against the accompanying invasion
of personal privacy. Id. at 559. This test differs from a generalized requirement of reasonable
behavior on the part of government officials. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09
(1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). See also Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
151. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the exclusionary rule leaves an innocent
victim of an illegal search and seizure without a remedy; it is therefore necessary to create a
damages remedy).
152. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Dissenting in Calandra, however,
Justice Brennan posits that the rule promotes judicial integrity and popular confidence in the
government by giving content and meaning to the guarantee of the fourth amendment. Deter-
rence is thus one objective served by the rule, but need not be the sole or primary goal served. Id.
at 356-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 347.
154. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665
(1970).
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ally based rule that is probably the most important constitutional de-
vice for supervising criminal proceedings in state courts should have
a more secure foundation than a theory that has never been tested.
Yet today, more than fifty years after the exclusionary rule was
adopted for the federal courts and almost a decade after it was im-
posed upon the state courts, there is still no convincing evidence to
verify the factual premise of deterrence upon which the rule is based
or to determine the limits of its effectiveness. 155
Moreover, society incurs high costs when a guilty felon is released be-
cause the arresting officer has erred. 156 The crime goes unpunished,
hampering the vindication of the state's criminal prohibitions. The
felon is at large to repeat his criminal acts, perhaps with a feeling of
impunity because of his successful encounter with the law. Further-
more, the public loses confidence in the judicial system when it ob-
serves criminals, clearly guilty, being set free on "technicalities." The
operation of the rule may also encourage police misconduct. A police
officer may be tempted to misreport the facts surrounding the search
and seizure to avoid operation of the exclusionary rule. 157
The Supreme Court, in Stone v. Powell,158 demonstrated that it is
willing to cut back on the exclusionary rule so that a viable alternative
may be developed. 159 Given the costs of the rule and its doubtful effec-
tiveness, this decreased reliance is a logical objective.
2. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Compensate. The exclusion-
ary rule is calculated to prevent fourth amendment violations, but not
to compensate the victims of such violations.160 In one sense, however,
a guilty criminal whose conviction has been barred by the exclusionary
rule is compensated for the violation of his fourth amendment rights:
155. Id. 671-72; see id. 678-701, 706-09. See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: an Empirical
Study ofthe Exclusionary Rule and Its41ternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). Spiotto, a stu-
dent of Professor Oaks, reaches the same conclusion as his mentor. For a critique of Spiotto's
methodology and conclusion, see Critique, On the Limitations ofEmpirical Evaluations of the Ex-
clusionary Rule: .4 Critique ofthe Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L.
REv. 740 (1974). Professor Oaks also noted that there were severe problems with constructing a
research method that would accurately demonstrate the efficacy of the exclusionary rule and that
the results reached could therefore not be vouched for with a high degree of certainty. Oaks,
supra note 154, at 709.
One commentator has remarked that the data is so inconclusive that the exclusionary rule
should not be summarily abandoned on the strength of such empirical studies. Canon, Is the
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion,
62 Ky. L.J. 681, 684-85 (1974).
156. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1976) (discussing the need for a deter-
rent against fourth amendment violations).
157. See Oaks, supra note 154, at 696-99.
158. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
159. Id. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
160. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
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he is set free. This form of redress is inappropriate for several reasons.
First, as noted above, the social costs of the exclusionary remedy are
high. Thus, the victim of fourth amendment abuse who is also a guilty
felon is overcompensated. Second, although a crude sense of justice
may dictate that a person should go free when his conviction is based
on illegally obtained evidence, the remedy provides no relief for injury
to the person's interest in personal privacy. 161 Instead, the rule merely
tolerates the commission of a crime because of police error.
Moreover, for the innocent victim of a fourth amendment viola-
tion, exclusion of evidence provides no benefit; he presumably would
have been acquitted regardless of whether any illegally obtained evi-
dence had been discovered and admitted at trial.162 Similarly, the ex-
clusionary rule does not benefit the victim of an illegal search that does
not lead to an arrest, indictment, or trial. The injury to a person's inter-
est in personal privacy remains unredressed. In no situation does the
exclusionary rule properly compensate the victim of an illegal search
and seizure.
C. Section 1983 Damage Action.
The advantage of a civil damage action brought under section
1983 is that it can both compensate the victim of an illegal search and
seizure and deter police misconduct. 63 Because the fourth amendment
protects an individual's right to personal privacy and security, 64 a
damage remedy is consistent with the nature of the right. The exclu-
sionary rule, on the other hand, does not attack fourth amendment vio-
lations from the perspective of protecting privacy interests. Rather, it is
"a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect .... ,,165 Although preven-
tion of fourth amendment violations is clearly a worthy goal, any sys-
tem of justice should satisfy the equally important objective of
providing compensation for victims of illegal police conduct. 66 A
161. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage
Remedyfor Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 449 n.6 (1978).
162. See Murphy v. Andrews, 465 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (because he was acquitted, the
defendant had no reason to appeal a denial of his motion to suppress; collateral estoppel was not
applied in his section 1983 damage action). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Gottlieb, Feedbackfrom the Fourth Amendment: Is the Exclusion-
ary Rule an Albatross around the Judicial Neck, 67 Ky. L.J. 1007, 1011 (1979); Newman, supra
note 161, at 449. See note 151 supra.
163. Gottlieb, supra note 162, at 1013; Newman, supra note 161, at 453.
164. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
165. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974) (emphasis added)).
166. See note 144 supra.
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fourth amendment violation directly injures the individual. This injury
must be compensated as would any other tort. Section 1983 is an effec-
tive mechanism for compensation.' 67 In addition, it performs a deter-
rence function, because compelling tortfeasors to pay damages is likely
to discourage tortious conduct.
The defenses to a section 1983 damage action must not be so ex-
pansive as to render the remedy useless. 168 Collateral estoppel is one
technique for debilitating the section 1983 remedy. Preventing and
correcting violations of the fourth amendment are goals far too impor-
tant to be hampered through the use of collateral estoppel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment protects a fundamental personal right to
freedom from certain government conduct. 169 An effective mechanism
for redress must exist for those persons injured by violation of this con-
stitutional provision. Fourth amendment violations represent miscon-
duct by the state and ultimately "threaten the vitality of a system of
ordered liberty."' 170 Congress has provided a powerful remedy for
fourth amendment violations through the enactment of section 1983.
Currently, however, the efficacy of the section 1983 remedy is
threatened by the application of collateral estoppel to section 1983 ac-
tions brought subsequent to state criminal proceedings. When a de-
fendant has litigated his fourth amendment claims in a state
suppression hearing, collateral estoppel bars federal review of his claim
in all but the few cases in which the United States Supreme Court
grants review.
For four reasons, collateral estoppel should not be applied under
these circumstances. First, in enacting section 1983, the Forty-second
167. But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), holding that without proof of actual injury,
the plaintiff could recover only nominal damages in a section 1983 action in which he alleged a
denial of procedural due process. The Court left open the possibility that a different measure of
damages would apply if the constitutional violation were of a different nature. Id. at 258. See
Note, Section 1983: AnAnalsis ofDamage Awards, 58 NEB. L. REv. 580 (1979).
168. Most section 1983 defendants can raise good faith and reasonable belief in probable
cause as defenses. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Some section 1983 defendants,
such as judges and prosecutors, have absolute immunity from section 1983 liability. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 501 (1978) (federal
officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules
than do state officers; only a qualified immunity against constitutional claims exists for federal
administrative officials). But see Owens v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980) (a munici-
pality is liable under section 1983 for constitutional violations committed by its officers). See
generally Comment, Derivative Immunity: An Unjustpfiable Bar to Section 1983 4ctions, 1980
DUKE LJ. 568.
169. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra.
170. Newman, supra note 161, at 447.
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Congress clearly contemplated that the federal courts would be the pri-
mary guardians of federal constitutional rights against erosion by the
states. This policy of generous access to the federal courthouse should
be implemented by permitting plaintiffs to bring section 1983 actions
for constitutional violations free of the bar of collateral estoppel. Sec-
ond, permitting issues of fact and law to be relitigated in a subsequent
section 1983 damage action impacts minimally on the finality and in-
tegrity of judgments rendered in a state court. Judgments of acquittal
or conviction are not attacked under a system that allows a defendant
to pursue his action for damages in a later federal action. 171 Third, the
lack of the federal habeas corpus remedy because of Stone v. Powell 72
throws a heavy burden of correcting fourth amendment infringements
upon suits brought pursuant to section 1983. If collateral estoppel is
applied uniformly to section 1983 actions that follow state court denials
of motions to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds, the in-
dividual will be denied all" opportunity to litigate his constitutional
claim in a federal court.
Finally, the fundamental importance of the freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and the inadequacy of the exclusionary
rule as a remedy compels the conclusion that an exception to collateral
estoppel is warranted in a damage action brought under section 1983.
The Supreme Court is dissatisfied with the exclusionary rule, as are
most jurists. 73 The section 1983 damage action is a superior remedy to
the exclusionary rule; it must not be made unavailable through rigid
application of collateral estoppel principles. The collateral estoppel
doctrine must be carefully applied "lest a blind adherence to it tend to
defeat the even firmer established policy of giving every litigant a full
and fair day in court."' 174
David E. Nash
171. See text accompanying notes 102-08 supra.
172. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See text accompanying notes 112-43 supra.
173. Eg., 428 U.S. at 500-01 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
174. United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 1948).
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